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1. Introduction 
Two commonly held beliefs are that macroeconomic conditions are a relevant 
determinant of election results, and that governments prefer to stay in office rather than out 
of office. As a result one should also consider that governments’ economic policies are 
determined by both economic and political considerations. Over the years a significant 
body of economic and political literature has tried to analyze voters and governments’ 
behaviour in order to unveil the precise nature of the relationship between politics and the 
economy. 
This paper explores the political determinants of fiscal policy choices. Everybody 
intuitively seems to think that if cutting taxes and entering on a sort of spending frenzy can 
bring electoral advantages to politicians, then they will actually do it, or at least try to do it. 
This and other more sophisticated assumptions are put to the test by a vast literature, but in 
general, an inherent weakness of a significant portion of these studies is that they rely on 
highly aggregated data, namely total expenditures, total revenues, current expenditures, 
capital expenditures or public deficits. With this type of data nothing can be said about the 
way governments allocate their expenditures inside those broad aggregates, hence, the 
picture researchers are getting is hazy. Assuming that governments actually increase 
spending in election years, we might immediately ask: in what areas are they spending 
more? Which components are preferred? Probably not all expenditure components are 
increased because we know that between buying more submarines or increasing the wages 
of public servants there is a difference in terms of the electoral output that is generated by 
each choice. Furthermore, finding evidence (or not) of political manipulations in total 
expenditures, total revenues or public deficits does not assure similar conclusions when 
checking inside these big aggregates. This means that the exploration of political cycles on 
the sub-levels of government expenditures is empirically relevant and can provide a better 
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understanding of the subject. Also by analyzing the vast range of expenditures that are at 
the disposal of governments, we are put a step closer to the reality of fiscal choices and 
policies. 
Only a few papers have looked, in the political perspective, to where and how the 
main components of public expenditures and revenues are allocated (see, for instance: 
Potrafke, 2010; Katsimi and Sarantides, 2012; Enkelman and Leibrecht, 2013; Morozoumi 
et al., 2014; and Castro and Martins, 2016). In this paper we go as far and as deep as the 
available data allows us in order to analyse whether electoral motives and government 
ideology can be observed at deeper disaggregated levels of public expenditures in a set of 
developed countries. Hence, using data for 18 European countries over the period 1990-
2012, we test for the presence of those effects in the functional components and sub-
components of public expenditures. This represents an important step forward relatively to 
the previous literature, as it allows us to identify (and understand) which items inside the 
main components of public expenditure are indeed being (or not) politically manipulated by 
incumbents. A comparison between some sub-groups of countries is also provided. 
An LSDVC estimator is used in the empirical analysis and the results point out to 
the presence of political opportunism at the aggregated and disaggregated levels of public 
expenditures, but no significant evidence of partisan or other political effects is found. The 
expenditure components that have proved to be more related to that behaviour are public 
services, health, education and social protection. These are expenditure components that 
include items that tend to generate more visible outcomes to voters, which might justify 
why they are preferred. Hence, a more disaggregated analysis is provided as a way of 
identifying those components and clarifying that issue. 
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the relevant 
literature. Section 3 describes the data and presents the econometric model. The main 
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results are presented and discussed in section 4. Some robustness checks are provided in 
section 5 and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
The political business cycles and partisan theories are the main theoretical 
frameworks that indicate how governments affect macroeconomic outcomes. The political 
business cycles theories are divided into models that assume agents with adaptive 
expectations (Nordhaus, 1975) and more recent models that adopt rational expectations 
(Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; and Rogoff, 1990). The main implication of these theories is that 
all politicians implement expansionary policies before elections with the objective of 
maximizing their electoral support and after the elections contractionary measures are 
required to correct the artificial unbalance generated previously. However, the assumption 
of rational agents tends to reduce this ability of policymaker's to induce the political cycle. 
Empirical studies suggest that favourable economic conditions benefit governments (Hibbs, 
2006) but opportunistic behaviour appears to gather more support in developing countries 
(see, for instance, Shi and Svensson, 2006; Brender and Drazen, 2008; and Vergne, 2009). 
Alternatively, both the adaptive (Hibbs, 1977) and rational (Alesina, 1987; Alesina 
and Sachs, 1988) versions of the partisan theory view politicians as heterogeneous, arguing 
that different parties have different policy objectives, behaving, when in office, in a partisan 
manner. Specifically, left-wing parties are relatively more concerned with unemployment 
(growth) than with inflation, whereas right-wing parties are especially worried with 
inflation control. In general, empirical evidence points out that partisan behaviour seems to 
be more recurrent in developed countries (see Alesina et al., 1992, 1997). 
The aim of this paper is to test for the presence of politically motivated cycles in the 
components of public expenditures. Governments’ fiscal policy has been an important topic 
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in the political and economic literature. Hence, the extension of the traditional approaches 
to fiscal policy is straightforward: boosts in expenditures and/or revenue reductions prior to 
elections should signal opportunistic behaviour, while in the partisan perspective left-wing 
governments are more prone to budget deficits than their counterparts. Rogoff and Sibert’s 
(1988) seminal model of political budgetary cycles is an adverse selection model 
underlining competence and asymmetric information. A further refinement made by Rogoff 
(1990) highlighted the need to search budgetary cycles inside the broad aggregates, 
especially in the composition of government spending. The model considered that the most 
efficient way for governments to signal competence is to divert spending from capital 
spending to current spending, thus favouring transfers and more visible programs. The idea 
is to increase those expenditures that send the strongest competence signals to the electorate 
and preferably those that are also noticeable immediately. 
Both at national and multi-national level, empirical results have provided evidence 
of political fiscal policy manipulation. Shi and Svensson (2002a, b; 2006), using multi-
country data, consistently capture political budget cycles and show that the effect is 
significantly stronger in less developed countries. For a set of developed countries, Persson 
and Tabellini (2003) find a political revenue cycle but not a political cycle in expenditures, 
budget or transfers. Focusing on EU countries, Andrikopoulos et al. (2004) also do not find 
a fiscal electoral cycle. However, Mink and de Haan (2006) report a budget deficit increase 
in electoral years in EU member states. They also show that left governments are slightly 
more prone to deficits than their counterparts. Efthyvoulou (2012) also concludes that 
governments across the EU tend to generate budgetary opportunistic cycles, but that these 
tend to be much larger in the Eurozone countries. 
In this paper go inside the main budget aggregates and analyze whether political 
motives can be observed at deeper levels of European countries’ public expenditures. 
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Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004), Veiga and Veiga (2007), Drazen and Eslava (2010), 
Aidt et al. (2011) and Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2011) found political opportunism at 
aggregated and disaggregated levels of public expenditures in Russia, Portugal, Colombia 
and Brazil, but restricted to the local/municipal level of government.
1
 
At the national level, the results found by Blais and Nadeau (1992) for Canada 
suggest a short pre-electoral cycle observable on road expenditures and social services. 
Also considering an economic decomposition of public expenditures, Katsimi and 
Sarantides (2012) and Morozoumi et al. (2014) show that elections tend to shift public 
spending towards current expenditures at the cost of public investment using a panel of 
countries. Brender and Drazen (2013) also disaggregate public spending but building a 
composite index, which does not allow us to identify what spending components are 
affected and how in election years. 
Looking at functional components of public expenditures, Potrafke (2010) finds that 
incumbents increase the growth of public health expenditures in election years, while  
Enkelman and Leibrecht (2013) conclude that election cycles are mainly found in the new 
democracies of Eastern Europe and in categories such as social welfare, general public 
services, environmental protection and infrastructures. Finally, Castro and Martins (2016) 
found political opportunism in health, social welfare and general public services when 
analysing Portuguese public expenditures. 
In this paper, we take a step forward in the analysis of politically driven cycles by 
looking for their presence in a panel of European countries at the level of the functional 
components of government expenditures and, most importantly, at the deeper level of their 
                                               
1 In particular, Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004), Veiga and Veiga (2007) and Drazen and Eslava (2010) 
provide evidence of a strategic opportunistic behaviour in the composition of local/municipal (investment) 
expenditures, especially in highly visible items to the electorate: infrastructure spending, buildings, roads and 
general constructions. 
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sub-components. The exploration of political cycles in the sub-levels of government 
expenditures is expected to provide a better understanding of the politically motivated 
cycles. As far as we are concerned, no other study has dig so deep inside public 
expenditures to unveil the hidden complexity of politically driven cycles. Furthermore, by 
analyzing the vast range of expenditure components at the disposal of governments, we can 
become more aware of the reality of fiscal choices and public policies. 
 
3. Data and model specification 
To explore the presence of opportunism and partisan effects in the composition of 
government expenditures, we collected annual data for 18 European countries over the 
period 1990-2012.
2
 These data were obtained from the Eurostat Database. 
The analysis developed in this study is based on a break-down of government 
expenditures as defined by the OECD in its Classification of the Functions of the 
Government (COFOG).
3
 It classifies government expenditure data from the System of 
National Accounts by the purpose for which the funds are used, also called functional 
decomposition. The first-level of this classification splits public expenditures into ten 
functional components: (i) general public services; (ii) defence; (iii) public order and 
safety; (iv) economic affairs; (v) environmental protection; (vi) housing and community 
amenities; (vii) health; (viii) recreation, culture and religion; (ix) education; (x) social 
protection. The second-level disaggregates each first-level group into up to nine sub-
components. 
                                               
2 The countries (data availability) considered in this study are: Austria (1995-2012), Belgium (1990-2012), 
Denmark (1990-2012), Finland (1990-2012), France (1995-2012), Germany(1991-2012), Greece (1990-
2012), Iceland (1998-2012), Ireland (1990-2012), Italy (1990-2012), Luxembourg (1990-2012), Netherlands 
(1995-2012), Norway (1990-2012), Portugal (1990-2012), Spain (1995-2012), Sweden (1995-2012), 
Switzerland (2005-2012), United Kingdom (1990-2012). 
3 See, for example, OECD (2015): Government at a Glance. 
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The total general government expenditures (TotExpd) and each of those ten 
components (and respective sub-components) are used as dependent variables in this 
analysis.
4
 Following Alesina et al. (1997), some political variables were added to the 
dataset to control for opportunistic and partisan effects and for political support: (i) a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the year of national legislative elections, and 0 
otherwise (ElectYr); (ii) a dummy variable that takes de value of 1 when there is hegemony 
or dominance of left-wing parties in the cabinet, and 0 otherwise (LeftGov); (iii) and a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a single party or coalition has majority in 
the parliament, and 0 otherwise (MajGov). The data for these variables were collected from 
the Comparative Political Data Set I.
5
 Additionally, we also obtained data from the Eurostat 
Database to control for the economic environment using the unemployment rate (Unemp), 
and for demographic issues or country-dimension considering its population (Pop). A 
complete description of the variables and some descriptive statistics can be found in Tables 
A.1 and A.2 in Annex. 
Looking at the descriptive statistics (see Table A.2 in the Annex) we observe that, 
on average, the total real government expenditures per capita in the group of countries 
analysed is close to 14 thousand of Euros, while the components in which governments 
tend to spend more are public services, economic affairs, health, education and social 
protection. Therefore, we expect that these components might be the ones in which the 
government has more margin to act politically. This is a hypothesis that we intend to test in 
our empirical analysis. 
                                               
4 See Table 1 for the definition of each component and sub-component. 
5 LeftGov was computed from the gov_party variable in the CPDS database (it is equal to 1 when gov_party is 
equal to 4 and 5, i.e. when there is dominance or hegemony of left-wing parties). MajGov was computed from 
the gov_type variable in the CPDS database (it is equal to 1 when gov_type is equal to 1, 2 and 3, i.e. 
government formed with a party(ies) with a majority of seats in the parliament). 
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We employ a dynamic panel data model to test for the predictions of the 





where i=1,…,18, t=1990,…,2012; the natural logarithm of ExpdCit represents the log of one 
of the components (or sub-component) of government expenditures. The coefficient on the 
lag of the dependent variable (γ) measures its persistence, while the coefficients β1, β2, β3 
measure, respectively, the impact of the opportunistic, partisan and political support effects 
on the expenditure components; δ1 and δ2 are the coefficients for the additional economic 
and demographic controllers. Regarding the last components, νi is the individual effect of 
each country i, and eit is the error term.
6
 
Given the presence of individual effects νi, the model can be estimated assuming 
that those effects as fixed or random. However, the lagged value of the dependent variable 
would be correlated with the error term even if the latter is not serially correlated. This 
implies that OLS estimates (random or fixed effects) will be biased and inconsistent. 
Although the fixed effects estimator gains consistency as the number of time periods 
increases, in our analysis its number is not big enough (T=23) to rely on its estimates. 
The estimators that take into account that bias can be grouped into: (i) instrumental 
variables estimators; (ii) and bias-corrected estimators. According to the large sample 
properties of the generalized method of moments (GMM), the dynamic estimator proposed 
by Arellano and Bond (1991) is adequate when there is a clear dominance of cross sections 
                                               
6 Time dummies and a time trend were also considered in other specifications but as they have proved not to 
be relevant they are not included in our baseline model. Moreover, our results and conclusions do not change 
with their inclusion. Those results are not reported here, but are available upon request. 
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over time periods in the sample. This is not the case in our panel, in which the cross 
sectional dimension is small (N=18), and about the same as the number of time periods 
(T=23). This means that dynamic panel data estimator developed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) is not the most suitable procedure to solve the problem. More specifically, given our 
panel structure, it will also be biased if employed to this analysis. Hence, a bias-corrected 
estimator is more appropriated here. Therefore, we apply Bruno’s (2005a, b) bias-corrected 
least squares dummy variable estimator (LSDVC) for dynamic panel data models with 
small N (and not large enough T). In the regressions, we employ the Blundell and Bond 
(1998) estimator as the initial estimator. In this case the instruments are collapsed as 
suggested by Roodman (2009), which makes sure that we avoid using invalid or too many 
instruments. Following Bloom et al. (2007), we undertake 50 repetitions of the procedure to 
bootstrap the estimated standard errors.
7
 The empirical results from panel data analysis 
using the LSDVC estimator are presented and discussed in the next section. 
 
4. Empirical results 
The results from the estimation of political opportunism and partisan effects in the 
components of public expenditures are presented in Table 1. We start by inspecting whether 
those effects are present at the aggregated level, i.e. in total general government 
expenditures. We use the natural logarithm of its real value per capita (LnTotExpd) as it 
allows us to easily and intuitively interpret the results in terms of percentages and mitigate 
possible heteroscedasticity problems in the error term (Wooldridge, 2013, p. 278). 
 
                                               
7 Bootstrapping the standard errors is a common practice when this estimator is applied because Monte Carlo 
simulations proved that the analytical variance estimator performs poorly for large coefficients of the lagged 
dependent variable (see Bruno, 2005a, b). We should also stress that our results do not qualitatively change 
with more repetitions (100, 200 or even 500) or when the Arellano and Bond (1991) or Anderson and Hsiao 
(1982) estimators are used as initial estimators. 
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[Insert Table 1 around here] 
 
The results presented in column (1) show that governments tend to increase total 
public expenditures (per capita) by about 1.3% during election years (ElectYr). These 
results are in line with the findings of other studies focusing on the UE (Mink and de Haan, 
2006; and Efthyvoulou, 2012). Nevertheless, no effects are found in terms of government 
orientation (LeftGov) or political support (MajGov). Therefore, no matter whether a right-
wing or left-wing government is in office, or whether it has a ruling majority or not, the 
behaviour is always the same: acting opportunistically to increase the chances of winning 
the elections. Additionally, we also observe that public expenditures are behaving pro-
cyclically – contrary to the Keynesian view – as they tend to increase (decrease) when the 
economic situation improves (deteriorates): for each percentage point increase in the 
unemployment rate (Unemp), total public expenditures per capita decrease by more than 
0.5%. The demographic conditions, here measured by the natural logarithm of total 
population (LnPop), have not proved to be relevant for the level of total government 
spending per capita. 
Empirical studies using this level of data aggregation on fiscal variables clearly 
dominate the literature and are consistently finding politically driven budgetary cycles. 
However, their findings do not say how policymakers use public expenditures to generate 
their expected outcome at the ballots. The results in column (1) do not allow us to figure 
out which components of public expenditures are being employed opportunistically near 
the elections. Moreover, they cannot also guarantee the complete absence of partisan 
movements inside the total expenditure aggregate. 
Hence, following Rogoff (1990) – who has already highlighted the need to search 
budgetary cycles inside the broad aggregates, especially in the composition of government 
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spending – we consider the ten functional components of government expenditures (as 
defined by the OECD) to uncover this reality. The results are presented in columns (2)-(11) 
of Table 1 and clearly indicate that the functional items in which expenditures are increased 
during elections are public services, health, education and social protection.
8
 These are the 
items in which governments tend to spend more in proportion to the total expenditure (as it 
is clear in the descriptive statistics – see Table A.2). Hence, the results confirm our 
hypothesis: the bigger categories of public expenditure are especially targeted by 
opportunistic governments. The results also seem to conform to the theoretical expectations 
because of the strong positive signalling to voters and the quick visibility that characterizes 
these categories. Nevertheless, only the reasons behind the opportunistic boost of public 
services seem a bit unclear. As this category includes transfers of a general character 
between different levels of government, it is possible that increased spending in this sub-
category may be happening in election years because they may be related to the quick 
conclusion of infrastructures (at the local or regional level) that can be beneficial to the 
government’s popularity, or to other highly visible items like, for example, the sponsorship 
of cultural and/or recreational local events. 
However, similarly to the findings for total expenditures, no effects are found 
regarding the political orientation and support of the party(ies) in office. This means that 
spending preferences seem to converge across governments while ideology retires to the 
background. 
When we look at the impact of the controllers, a worse economic environment has a 
negative impact in the almost all the components, except in public services. In this 
                                               
8 Like for total expenditures, the natural logarithm of each expenditure component is used as dependent 
variable, which makes its interpretation easier. In particular, during election years spending in public services 
per capita tend to be 3.5% higher. Moreover, smoothing the scale of measure of the dependent variable, using 
logs, can also mitigate possible heteroscedasticity problems in the error term (see Wooldridge, 2013, p. 278). 
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particular case, an increase in the unemployment rate generates an increase in public 
services (in line with the Keynesian view), which, as we will verify later, might be related 
to an increase in public debt transactions due to the economic slowdown. However, in 
general, expenditures tend to decrease when the economic conditions deteriorate. 
Regarding the demographic scale effect, we find that per capita expenditures on public 
services, economic affairs and housing tend to increase with the population (a higher 
population demands for more spending per capita in this fields), while spending on 
recreation and education per capita presents the opposite effect (items in which economies 
of scale are easier to reach). 
Finally, total government expenditures and all the components exhibit a reasonable 
degree of persistence, as the coefficient associated to the respective lagged dependent 
variables is always highly significant. Hence, this evidence supports the use of our dynamic 
panel framework. 
However, we reach a point in which we are tempted to ask which items, deep inside 
of each component, are being indeed opportunistically manipulated? If we are able to 
uncover that mystery we can have a clearer picture of this behaviour. This is something 
that, as far as we are concerned, no study has yet considered. To proceed with this analysis, 
we collected data on items or sub-components of each component of public expenditures 
available from the Eurostat database, even though they present a shorter time span (1995-
2012) than the previous data and also some missing data for a few countries/components. 
Nevertheless, we ended up with reasonably good sets of panel data for each sub-
component, which allows us to proceed with a more fine-tuned empirical analysis. The 
results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. The structure of the model used in these estimations 
remains identical to the analysis for the first level components, in the sense that each 
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equation is related to the respective sub-component and estimated using the LSDVC 
estimator over the same political variables and controllers. 
 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 
A primary interest regarding these results is to see the origin of public services’ 
electoral importance. Both Enkelman and Leibrecht (2013) and Castro and Martins (2016) 
find it to be strongly significant. Unfortunately, data on transfers of a general character 
between different levels of government (TransfGen) are missing or of poor quality for most 
countries, which made it impossible test our earlier hypothesis. Available results show that 
the only statistically relevant sub-component is expenditures on executive and legislative 
organs, financial and fiscal affairs and external affairs (ExecAff) and that opportunism is the 
only effect found. When we look at the expenditures lodged in this sub-item (see Eurostat, 
2011) we conjecture that the management costs of public funds and public debt may be 
increasing in electoral years. That might be the case, not just because this sub-item is 
associated with the ability to increase spending in other categories but also because the 
Eurostat states that the interests connected to delayed debt payments are often included in 
this sub-category. Debt payments in electoral years are probably not in the best interest of 
opportunistic governments as they tend to divert resources from electorally efficient 
spending. Another source of extra spending in this sub-category is related to physical 
amenities provided to the chief executive, the legislature and their aides, and to 
commissions and committees created by the chief executive. Normally politics intensifies 
in electoral years, so one should expect to see an increase in those expenditures, although, 
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per se, they probably cannot account for a political cycle, more so because they may or may 
not be electorally driven. 
For the controllers the results are in line with the expectations and with the ones 
obtained in the PubServ equation in Table 1. Here we confirm that the unexpected positive 
impact of Unemp on PubServ might be due to the pressure that a worse economic 
environment puts on public debt transactions (DebtTrs). In the other items the impact is 
negative as expected. 
Regarding the sub-components of expenditures on defence, the results indicate no 
presence of opportunistic, partisan or political support effects in any of them, which is in 
line with the findings reported in Table 1 for defence (the same can be said for the 
controllers). However, when we look at the results for public order and economic affairs we 
are faced with two interesting surprises: even though no evidence of opportunism is found 
for each of those components, when we dig deeper we find that expenditures in police 
services (Police, in public order) and in agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting (Agric in 
Economic Affairs) are significantly increased during election years (2.5% in the first sub-
item and 6.1% in the second). Probably governments want to reinforce their popularity 
within the workforce of these sectors and also with the increased spending on police they 
want to signal competence and increase the voters’ sympathy towards them by assuring 
more general safety in election years. No other political effects are found and the signs and 
significance of the coefficients on the controllers are, in general, consistent with the ones 
reported in Table 1 for each component. The same happens for the controllers in the 
environmental protection items. However, despite no opportunistic effects are found, left 
governments seem to spend more on other expenditures of that component (OthEnvir). On 
the contrary, left (and majority) governments tend to spend less in community development 
(ComDev) in what concerns to housing and community amenities (see Table 3). 
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The expenditure component in which more political opportunism is found in its 
items is health. As far as our disaggregated analysis goes, per capita expenditures in all 
items of health tend to increase significantly in years of elections, ranging from estimated 
rises of 2.5% in hospital services (HospServ) to 7.1% in medical products, appliances and 
equipment (MedProd). The strategy of providing better health care to the populations in 
election years is consistent with political opportunism as it can improve governments’ 
popularity in all segments of the voting population. Additionally, we also find some 
partisan effects: left-wing governments spend more on public health services (PubHlth) and 
on research and development in health (HlthRD) than centre or right-wing parties. Although 
these partisan results conform to the theoretical expectations, the regression for the 
component itself only shows opportunistic effects (see Table 1). It is only when we dig 
deeper in the analysis of its sub-components that we realise the real importance of the 
opportunism and are able to extract some partisan effects. Taking into account not only the 
case of health expenditures, but also public order and economic affairs (analysed above), it 
seems that some of the more aggregated data conceals the political manipulation of public 
expenditures. It is only when we look “under the microscope” that we really become aware 
of some important aspects of government’s behaviour regarding fiscal policy. 
Recreation remains a component in which, even disaggregating the analysis for its 
components, no significant political effects are found. On the contrary, for education and 
social protection we have some interesting results. First, it has become clear that most of 
the opportunism on expenditures in education is related to an increase in pre-primary and 
primary education (Prim) during election years. This is the basis of all educational system 
and voters tend to take a special attention and be very concerned with the quality of 
education of their young children (qualification of the teachers, infrastructures, 
materials,…). Second, some partisan effects are found for secondary (Second) and general 
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education expenditures not defined by level (Genr), sub-components of education in which 
left-wing governments tend to spend more. Third, our results also point out that majority 
governments are more prone than minority ones to cut expenditures at higher levels of 
education (Tert). 
Another universally accepted “good” policy that tends to provide dividends at the 
ballots is to improve the protection of the sick and of those with disabilities. Our results 
show that these expenditures are higher during election periods (SickDis in social 
protection). Despite no significant opportunism is found in unemployment protection 
(UnemPrt), our results indicate that they tend to increase when the unemployment rate 
rises, which, in the particular case of this item, is in line with what we would expect. We 
should note that regarding the other items, a deterioration of the economic activity has as 
consequence a cut in their spending. 
Apart from these findings, no other results are found. Nevertheless, we should stress 
that the lack of information for some countries in some sub-components and the shorter 
time period might affect the quality of the results in comparison with the ones obtained for 
the main components. However, the results for the sub-components are, in general, 
qualitatively, quantitatively and statistically consistent with the ones for the respective 
components of public expenditures. Most importantly, they provide a rich set of outcomes 
that help us get a clearer view of where the political manipulation of expenditures actually 
happens. 
 
5. Robustness checks 
To check the robustness of our results we decided to separate the analysis into three 
blocks or sub-groups of countries. The first sub-group that we consider is formed by Nordic 
countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden). These are considered to have 
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well established democracies, with a long tradition and have the reputation of being more 
concerned in keeping public accounts balanced. On the opposite side – not only 
geographically – we have the South European countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain), 
which are characterized by more unstable and younger democracies, that traditionally 
exhibit more unbalanced public accounts and growing public debts. In the middle, we have 
the remaining group of Central European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom), also with well-
established democracies as the Nordic, but with their own specificities and with a different 
agenda in what concerns to promote balanced public accounts. The idea here is twofold: (i) 
infer the presence of political opportunism (and possible partisan effects) in each of these 
three sub-groups; (ii) and emphasize the differences between them. 
A first glance at the results reported in Table 4 reveals three interesting aspects. The 
first is that if we would focus only on the outcomes for total expenditures (column 1) we 
would conclude that no evidence of political effects is found for the Nordic countries. In 
fact, majority governments seem to be more prone to environmental and 
cultural/recreational spending, and some evidence of opportunism is also found in public 
services for this group of countries. It seems that Nordic countries have been successful in 
mitigating that electoral effect over total spending – probably with adjustments in the other 
components – while Southern countries do not. Secondly, this opportunism in general 
public services is common to all three groups of countries. Thirdly, following Brender and 
Drazen’s (2005) claim, one would expect that Southern European countries, as younger 
democracies with a more pronounced history of unbalanced public accounts, might be 
characterized by a higher degree of political manipulation. However the majority of the 
opportunistic effects are found in the more established democracies of central Europe. Also 
the partisan effects found seem to be exclusive to this subset: left-wing governments are 
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more prone to increase total spending and expenditures in public order, recreation, 
education and social protection. Finally, in what concerns to the other coefficients 
(controllers, persistence,…), the results do not change much in comparison with the ones 
presented in Table 1 for all the countries. 
 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
 
Similarly to what we did for the sample of all countries, we also tried to check 
political effects at a deeper disaggregated level (sub-components). Those results are 
presented in Table 5. Only the estimates for the political variables are reported to save 
space, but the missing results for the controllers are available upon request. 
The results offer a great deal of extra information and in general confirm the 
findings reported in Table 3 for the sample of all countries. We can highlight some of the 
information that seems particularly interesting. Expenditures on executive affairs (ExcAff) 
remain as the item of public services in which a more significant rise is felt during election 
years, and continues to be common to all three sub-groups of countries. Nordic countries do 
not present additional significant increases in other sub-components of public expenditures. 
On the contrary, our results show that during election periods they cut spending on other 
public order expenditures (OthPO), waste water management (WastWat) and housing 
development (HousDev). As we pointed out above, this behaviour might be the reason why 
political opportunism is not found at the aggregated level: they compensate the rise in one 
item by decreasing the spending in others. Overall, their strategy might be more of 




                                               
9
 Morozumi et al. (2014) also find a similar behaviour in established democracies, where governments seem 
to reallocate expenditure and revenue components in election years, keeping their total levels unchanged. 
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[Insert Table 5 around here] 
 
On the contrary, Central European governments have a more widespread 
opportunistic behaviour that involves rises in police spending (Police), pollution abatement 
(Pollut), community development (ComDev), in all health items, primary school education 
(Prim), sickness and disability (SickDis) and family and children expenditures (Family) in 
years of elections. Almost all items related to the components in which political 
opportunism was identified for this group of countries (see Table 4). 
For Southern European countries we uncover some additional opportunism 
regarding other expenditures items like agriculture (Agric), transports (Transp), hospital 
services spending (HospServ) and higher education (Tert). Undoubtedly, this analysis for 
the sub-components of public expenditures provides finer details about the way policy-
makers try to maximize their chances of reelection that otherwise might remain hidden. 
Regarding the partisan effects, they are still present in the group of Central 
countries, especially in what concern to sub-components of housing, education and social 
protection (ComDev, OthHous, SubServ and Survivors). But they are also observed in some 
items for Southern and Nordic countries. 
We also did some additional sensitivity analysis to verify if our findings were robust 
to changes in the political variables, in the controllers and to cross effects between the 
variables (see Tables A.3 and A.4 in the Annex). Specifically, we begin by checking 
whether governments start to increase expenditures well before the elections year (see top 
of Table A.3 in the Annex). Thus, we add to the model a dummy that takes the value of one 
in the year before the elections (YrBefElect). The results indicate that governments prefer to 
act opportunistically in the elections year, and not before. Nevertheless, expenditures on 
economic affairs present a marginally significant increase in the year before elections, 
which can indicate that governments might be preparing the field for the election year. 
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Then, we replaced YrBefElect and ElectYr by a dummy that takes de value of one in 
the year after the elections, and 0 otherwise (YrAftElect) to test for the presence of a full or 
complete opportunistic cycle. Apart from defense, the coefficients on YrAftElect are all 
negative (in contrast to the positive ones on ElectYr), supporting the pos-electoral 
predictions of opportunistic models and the results found by Castro and Martins (2016). 
Next, instead of using dummies to control for the electoral period, we employ a 
variable that controls for the timing of the elections by measuring the proportion of time 
that has elapsed since the last election, i.e. it measures the proportion of time a government 
is in office in a particular year, since it has been elected (ElectTiming).
10
 The results remain 
consistent with the ones discussed above and with the ones reported in Table 1. 
Although with the previous changes no significant partisan or political support 
effects are found, we replaced the dummy variable LeftGov by a set of four dummies that 
act like a kind of fine-tuning for the partisan effects (see Table A.4): Partisan1 (dummy 
variable that takes de value of one when there is hegemony of right-wing and center parties 
in office); Partisan2 (dummy variable that takes de value of one when there is dominance 
of right-wing and centre parties in office); Partisan3 (dummy variable that takes de value 
of one when there is balance of power between left and right-wing parties in office); and 
Partisan4 (dummy variable that takes de value of one when there is dominance of social-
democratic and other left parties in office).
11
 In general the partisan effects found are weak 
                                               
10 It is equal to 1 in the election year. 
11 The basis-category is Partisan5 which refers to those governments in which there is hegemony of social-
democratic and other left-wing parties. Like the LeftGov variable, those five partisan dummies were computed 
from the variable gov_party in the CPDS database. 
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and no clear (or significant) trends are identified; moreover, no significant effects are 
observed at the aggregated level (total spending).
12
 
Different controllers to our models are also tested (second block of results in Table 
A.4). Replacing Unemp by the growth rate of real GDP (RealGDPgr) and LnPop by the 
percentage of people in total population with age lower than 15 (Young) and with 65 and 
over (Elderly). Qualitatively, the main conclusions of this study are not affected with the 
use of these other proxies for economic environment and demographic issues.
13
 
As a final exercise, we decided to test the cross-effects between the expenditures 
components. We replaced the dependent variable in the previous components-equations by 
the logarithm of the ratio of each component relatively to the others (and to total 
expenditures). This means that now we are measuring the relative effects between the 
components when the covariates change. The results are presented in Table 6, but only for 




[Insert Table 6 around here] 
 
Each line in Table 6 presents the political effect for the log of the ratio of the 
respective component to each of the other components that are in each column. The results 
clearly show that expenditures in public services increase significantly in elections years 
relatively to almost all the other components of public expenditures (ranging from 1.8% to 
                                               
12 We also replaced MajGov by GovSup>50%, which corresponds to a dummy that takes value of one when 
the seat share of all parties in government is higher than 50% (in this case, weighted by the numbers of days 
in office in a given year), however, no significant effects are found. 
13 We also tried to test for the interaction effects between ElectYr and LeftGov, MajGov and Unemp (or 
RealGDPgr), but the respective coefficients were always statistically insignificant. Those results are not 
reported here to save space, but they are available upon request. 
14
 Each regression was estimated with the same covariates used in our baseline model, but the estimates on 
their coefficients are not reported here to save space; however, they are available upon request. 
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3.6%), and inclusive relatively to total expenditures (where the relative rise is of about 
2.3%).
15
 Overall, the results are consistent in showing public services as the component that 
is privileged by governments to generate the necessary conditions for them to obtain the 
required support to win the elections. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper analyses the presence of opportunism, partisan and political support 
effects in the functional components and sub-components of public expenditures using data 
for 18 European countries over the period 1990-2012. The empirical analysis points out to a 
strong presence of political business cycles at the aggregated and disaggregated levels of 
public expenditures, contrasting with the weak and limited evidence found for the partisan 
cycles. Furthermore, some effects would remain undetected if we relied solely on 
traditional aggregate data. The amount of relevant information found by the in depth 
analyses of government expenditures is quite significant, enabling us to better understand 
what is actually being politically driven. The components of public spending identified as 
being significantly manipulated in election years are: public services, health, education and 
social protection. These are chosen probably because they aggregate items that tend to 
generate more visible outcomes to voters. Furthermore, it seems that the bigger categories 
of expenditure are especially targeted by governments near elections. A deeper analysis of 
their sub-components reveals more precisely the nature of the expenditures actually 
increasing in election years. We found that was the case of (i) expenditures on all health 
items; (ii) expenditures on primary education; (iii) expenditures on sickness and disability. 
Reinforcing the budget on these categories is seen across all segments of the population as 
                                               
15
 Note also that health expenditures increase, in election years, relatively to environment, but the effect is 
only very marginally significant. 
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a “good” policy, hence increasing governments’ popularity. These are highly visible 
polices, with quick short term effects and very much consistent with political opportunism. 
Our results also show that public services have proved to be the component that is 
more robust and consistent across alternative model specifications. The only sub-category 
found to be always targeted in election years is expenditures on executive and legislative 
organs, financial and fiscal affairs and external affairs. The management costs of public 
funds and public debt included inside this sub-category might be a relevant source for the 
cycle found at this level. Hence, this study contributes to the understanding of the hidden 
complexity of political business cycles hidden inside the main aggregates of public 
expenditures. 
We also conclude that political opportunism in Central European countries ranges 
over several components, while in Nordic and South European countries it is concentrated 
in public services. But Nordic countries seem to have been able to mitigate this evidence in 
total expenditures by making surgical negative adjustments in the other components. 
Finally, we also verify that a worse economic environment exerts a negative impact 
in the almost all the components, while the demographic effects are more or less dependent 
on the specificities of each component. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Political opportunism and partisan effects in the components of public expenditures 
Dep. Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Log of (per capita) TotExpd PubServ Defence PubOrder EconAff Environm Housing Health Recreat Educ SocProtect 
            
ElectYr 0.013** 0.035*** 0.005 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.009 0.017* 0.011 0.013** 0.016*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.016) (0.023) (0.024) (0.016) (0.032) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.006) 
LeftGov -0.002 -0.001 -0.015 0.049 -0.035 0.031 0.052 0.021 0.018 0.013 0.003 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.023) (0.032) (0.037) (0.022) (0.043) (0.016) (0.017) (0.010) (0.008) 
MajGov 0.004 0.021 -0.006 0.009 -0.005 0.003 -0.007 0.002 0.006 -0.009 0.012 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.031) (0.043) (0.042) (0.029) (0.060) (0.020) (0.022) (0.013) (0.011) 
Unemp -0.006*** 0.003** -0.010*** -0.007* -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.024*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
LnPop 0.064 0.166** -0.147 0.055 1.145*** -0.057 0.584* -0.188 -0.345** -0.161* 0.063 
 (0.093) (0.077) (0.173) (0.265) (0.304) (0.203) (0.351) (0.156) (0.154) (0.096) (0.103) 
LnTotExpdpc(-1) 0.934***           
 (0.026)           
LnPubServpc(-1)  0.940***          
  (0.024)          
LnDefencepc(-1)   0.817***         
   (0.034)         
LnPubOrderpc(-1)    0.901***        
    (0.025)        
LnEconaffpc(-1)     0.542***       
     (0.043)       
LnEnvironmpc(-1)      0.873***      
      (0.030)      
LnHousingpc(-1)       0.494***     
       (0.034)     
LnHealthpc(-1)        0.959***    
        (0.025)    
LnRecreatpc(-1)         0.960***   
         (0.024)   
LnEducpc(-1)          0.970***  
          (0.022)  
LnSocProtectpc(-1)           0.945*** 
           (0.026) 
            
            
No. Observations 346 346 346 346 344 346 346 346 346 346 346 
No. Countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
            
Notes: See Tables A.1 and A.2 in Annex. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the 
null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. The logarithm of the real value of each expenditure component 
per capita is used as dependent variable in each equation. A bias-corrected least squares dummy variable (LSDVC) 
estimator for dynamic panel data models is employed. The Blundell and Bond (1998) procedure is used as the initial 
estimator. We undertake 50 repetitions of the procedure to bootstrap the estimated standard errors. The results do not 
qualitatively change with more repetitions (100, 200 or 500) or when the Arellano and Bond (1991) or Anderson and 




  30 
 
Table 2. Sub-components analysis (part I) 
 1. Public Services 2. Defence 3. Public Order 
Dep.Vars.: (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) (1.6) (1.7) (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) (3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) 
Log of (p.c.) ExecAff ForAid GServ BasicRD GServRD OthServ DebtTrs MilDef CivDef FMilAid DefRD OthDef Police Fire Courts Prisions OthPO 
                  
ElectYr 0.033** 0.039 0.030 -0.016 0.011 0.062 0.011 -0.006 -0.044 0.022 -0.092 0.100 0.025** 0.015 0.011 0.002 -0.061 
 (0.017) (0.037) (0.031) (0.151) (0.049) (0.072) (0.021) (0.019) (0.072) (0.060) (0.072) (0.117) (0.011) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.051) 
LeftGov -0.004 0.059 0.007 0.134 0.094 0.091 -0.008 0.008 -0.035 -0.046 -0.054 0.081 0.007 -0.007 -0.017 0.010 0.001 
 (0.021) (0.039) (0.035) (0.172) (0.071) (0.090) (0.024) (0.022) (0.084) (0.087) (0.094) (0.123) (0.012) (0.017) (0.015) (0.020) (0.070) 
MajGov 0.009 -0.069 -0.086* 0.152 0.083 -0.037 0.013 -0.038 0.022 0.049 0.039 -0.120 0.002 -0.033 -0.012 -0.019 0.070 
 (0.027) (0.056) (0.047) (0.173) (0.073) (0.101) (0.031) (0.029) (0.161) (0.090) (0.122) (0.175) (0.015) (0.023) (0.021) (0.027) (0.092) 
Unemp -0.008** -0.039*** -0.021*** 0.027 -0.025*** -0.012 0.008** -0.011*** 0.003 -0.014 0.006 -0.026 -0.008*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.010*** 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.026) (0.010) (0.016) (0.004) (0.004) (0.029) (0.012) (0.020) (0.026) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012) 
LnPop 0.414 2.689*** 0.790* 2.908* -0.702 2.644*** 0.952*** 0.536** -0.416 1.381* 0.733 -0.180 0.102 0.771*** 0.737*** 0.549* -0.274 
 (0.296) (0.613) (0.427) (1.736) (0.497) (0.802) (0.236) (0.249) (1.740) (0.819) (1.215) (1.425) (0.226) (0.237) (0.216) (0.296) (0.603) 
DepVar(-1) 0.777*** 0.621*** 0.754*** 0.351*** 0.931*** 0.643*** 0.988*** 0.778*** 0.586*** 0.802*** 0.740*** 0.703*** 0.942*** 0.816*** 0.821*** 0.813*** 0.872*** 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.050) (0.077) (0.039) (0.062) (0.038) (0.052) (0.080) (0.063) (0.060) (0.053) (0.044) (0.037) (0.031) (0.048) (0.045) 
                  
                  
No. Observ. 229 223 229 202 198 214 229 229 153 199 184 179 229 229 229 229 223 
No.Countries 17 16 17 15 15 15 17 17 13 15 14 13 17 17 17 17 17 
                  
                  
 4. Economic Affairs 5. Environmental Protection   
Dep.Vars.: (4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) (4.6) (4.7) (4.8) (4.9) (5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) (5.6)   
Log of (p.c.) GenAff Agric Energy Constr Transp Communic OthInd EAffRD OthEAff Waste WastWater Pollut Protect EnvirRD OthEnvir   
                  
ElectYr -0.020 0.061* -0.059 0.013 0.028 -0.023 -0.001 -0.028 -0.016 -0.003 -0.106 0.121 -0.060 0.021 -0.010   
 (0.073) (0.036) (0.080) (0.068) (0.034) (0.143) (0.040) (0.026) (0.096) (0.043) (0.066) (0.086) (0.039) (0.069) (0.028)   
LeftGov 0.024 -0.012 0.135 0.110 0.013 -0.251 -0.024 0.017 0.088 0.020 -0.099 0.043 0.040 -0.021 0.063**   
 (0.084) (0.037) (0.088) (0.101) (0.038) (0.153) (0.048) (0.030) (0.111) (0.048) (0.070) (0.152) (0.041) (0.103) (0.030)   
MajGov 0.027 -0.034 -0.033 -0.067 -0.012 -0.066 -0.057 -0.025 0.113 0.053 0.006 -0.146 -0.001 -0.013 0.027   
 (0.112) (0.048) (0.123) (0.090) (0.051) (0.204) (0.057) (0.040) (0.143) (0.064) (0.097) (0.198) (0.054) (0.126) (0.045)   
Unemp 0.027* -0.026*** 0.006 -0.031* -0.023*** -0.073*** -0.026*** -0.009 -0.032* -0.011 -0.016 -0.047** -0.028*** -0.046*** -0.009*   
 (0.014) (0.006) (0.016) (0.016) (0.006) (0.027) (0.007) (0.006) (0.018) (0.008) (0.011) (0.023) (0.009) (0.016) (0.005)   
LnPop 2.976*** 0.715* 1.906* -0.073 1.771*** 4.045** 0.589 0.394 0.488 1.187** 0.533 3.335** 1.299** 3.535*** 0.785*   
 (1.024) (0.389) (1.092) (0.869) (0.488) (1.632) (0.449) (0.531) (1.177) (0.548) (0.706) (1.481) (0.623) (1.194) (0.414)   
DepVar(-1) 0.604*** 0.506*** 0.675*** 0.713*** 0.623*** 0.312*** 0.825*** 0.925*** 0.722*** 0.792*** 0.839*** 0.459*** 0.710*** 0.554*** 0.668***   
 (0.080) (0.062) (0.056) (0.050) (0.065) (0.065) (0.048) (0.054) (0.063) (0.037) (0.054) (0.086) (0.044) (0.075) (0.044)   
                  
                  
No. Observ. 229 229 223 222 229 229 222 223 229 229 214 216 222 214 223   
No.Countries 17 17 16 16 17 17 17 16 17 17 16 16 16 16 16   
                  
Notes: See Tables 1 and Table A.1 in Annex. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. Data for 
TransfGen, (in Public Services) and PubOrdRD (in Public Order) are missing for most of the countries; the lack of variability makes impossible to run the model for the respective equations. 
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Table 3. Sub-components analysis (part II) 
 6. Housing Amenities 7. Health 8. Recreation 
Dep.Vars.: (6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4) (6.5) (6.6) (7.1) (7.2) (7.3) (7.4) (7.5) (7.6) (8.1) (8.2) (8.3) (8.4) (8.5) (8.6) 
Log of (p.c.) HousDev ComDev WatSup StrLight HousRD OthHous MedProd OutPServ HospServ PubHlth HlthRD OthHlth Sports Culture Broadcast Religious RecrRD OthRecr 
                   
ElectYr 0.022 0.015 0.072 0.019 0.059 0.159 0.071** 0.054** 0.024*** 0.047** 0.063** -0.008 0.017 0.016 0.001 0.033 0.010 -0.089 
 (0.089) (0.087) (0.046) (0.042) (0.103) (0.105) (0.034) (0.027) (0.008) (0.024) (0.028) (0.050) (0.016) (0.020) (0.085) (0.035) (0.073) (0.074) 
LeftGov -0.010 -0.266*** 0.050 0.044 -0.092 0.055 0.004 0.008 0.001 0.062** 0.065** -0.032 0.011 0.029 -0.049 -0.046 0.112* -0.024 
 (0.122) (0.099) (0.083) (0.069) (0.130) (0.132) (0.052) (0.041) (0.011) (0.030) (0.030) (0.058) (0.017) (0.021) (0.097) (0.056) (0.067) (0.091) 
MajGov -0.055 -0.310** -0.038 0.095 0.074 0.330* -0.013 -0.005 -0.011 -0.005 0.004 -0.058 -0.030 -0.027 0.076 -0.084 0.041 -0.152 
 (0.151) (0.135) (0.079) (0.090) (0.114) (0.198) (0.045) (0.036) (0.014) (0.037) (0.041) (0.076) (0.024) (0.029) (0.121) (0.068) (0.090) (0.122) 
Unemp -0.039** -0.022 -0.033*** -0.010 -0.015 -0.001 -0.021*** -0.017*** -0.012*** -0.010** -0.008* -0.005 -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.007 -0.032*** -0.004 -0.029** 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.018) (0.008) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.003) (0.004) (0.016) (0.008) (0.014) (0.014) 
LnPop 3.042*** -0.068 0.840 0.544 0.387 0.857 0.644 0.560 0.116 0.354 -0.696 1.395* 0.161 -0.658** -1.148 -0.851* 0.595 -0.706 
 (1.068) (0.972) (0.668) (0.992) (1.499) (1.780) (0.460) (0.386) (0.164) (0.419) (0.461) (0.750) (0.294) (0.326) (1.070) (0.480) (0.816) (0.886) 
DepVar(-1) 0.345*** 0.939*** 0.704*** 0.910*** 0.780*** 0.840*** 0.820*** 0.888*** 0.964*** 0.892*** 0.991*** 0.815*** 0.877*** 0.811*** 0.910*** 0.700*** 0.645*** 0.902*** 
 (0.067) (0.040) (0.044) (0.086) (0.067) (0.044) (0.041) (0.043) (0.029) (0.036) (0.042) (0.058) (0.036) (0.047) (0.043) (0.044) (0.048) (0.049) 
                   
                   
No. Observ. 227 203 212 145 145 166 222 222 212 223 229 229 229 229 229 225 186 192 
No.Countries 17 15 16 11 11 13 16 16 16 16 17 17 17 17 17 17 14 14 
                   
                   
 9. Education 10. Social Protection  
Dep.Vars.: (9.1) (9.2) (9.3) (9.4) (9.5) (9.6) (9.7) (9.8) (10.1) (10.2) (10.3) (10.4) (10.5) (10.6) (10.7) (10.8) (10.9)  
Log of (p.c.) Prim Second PosSec Tert Genr SubServ EducRD OthEduc SickDis Olders Survivors Family UnemPrt HousPrt SocExcl SocPrtRD OthSocP  
                   
ElectYr 0.019** 0.006 0.099 0.013 0.001 0.027 0.007 -0.008 0.022** 0.007 0.012 0.015 0.005 0.048 -0.031 0.081 0.011  
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.105) (0.018) (0.031) (0.025) (0.047) (0.031) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.013) (0.026) (0.074) (0.040) (0.089) (0.027)  
LeftGov 0.012 0.022** -0.049 0.001 0.122*** 0.011 -0.066 0.028 0.005 -0.009 0.026* -0.008 0.030 0.005 0.014 0.168 0.024  
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.123) (0.019) (0.047) (0.030) (0.069) (0.034) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.029) (0.121) (0.045) (0.142) (0.031)  
MajGov -0.007 -0.008 0.093 -0.059** 0.047 0.043 -0.121 0.007 -0.018 0.006 0.025 0.004 -0.024 -0.027 -0.043 -0.136 0.044  
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.169) (0.025) (0.054) (0.039) (0.082) (0.045) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.019) (0.039) (0.139) (0.060) (0.135) (0.040)  
Unemp -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.043*** -0.008*** -0.001 -0.012** -0.023** -0.012** -0.009*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.020*** 0.011** -0.041*** -0.014* -0.022 -0.015***  
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.016) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.016) (0.007) (0.021) (0.005)  
LnPop -0.111 0.151 1.210 -0.065 1.009** 0.844 -0.002 0.112 0.366* 0.645*** 0.070 0.333 1.461*** 2.357* 1.424*** 5.232*** -0.108  
 (0.146) (0.160) (1.229) (0.205) (0.421) (0.525) (0.754) (0.465) (0.202) (0.214) (0.161) (0.298) (0.336) (1.320) (0.530) (1.648) (0.349)  
DepVar(-1) 0.996*** 0.915*** 0.637*** 1.054*** 0.593*** 0.870*** 0.981*** 0.896*** 0.937*** 0.889*** 0.980*** 0.947*** 0.811*** 0.661*** 0.738*** 0.789*** 0.939***  
 (0.027) (0.035) (0.058) (0.027) (0.042) (0.051) (0.041) (0.051) (0.034) (0.038) (0.029) (0.040) (0.057) (0.060) (0.053) (0.065) (0.035)  
                   
                   
No. Observ. 229 229 161 229 216 223 222 229 229 229 229 229 229 212 229 185 229  
No.Countries 17 17 12 17 15 16 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 16 17 15 17  
                   
Notes: See Tables 1 and 2 and Table A.1 in Annex. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. 
DepVar(-1) represents the first lag of the respective dependent variable. 
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Table 4. Robustness check I: Nordic, Central and South European countries 
Log of (p.c.) TotExpd PubServ Defence PubOrder EconAff Environm Housing Health Recreat Educ SocProtect 
Nordic (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
ElectYr 0.002 0.042** -0.018 0.024 -0.022 -0.022 -0.073 0.012 0.022 0.006 0.018 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.036) (0.019) (0.040) (0.031) (0.078) (0.019) (0.024) (0.018) (0.017) 
LeftGov -0.016 0.020 -0.041 -0.023 -0.073 0.016 0.081 -0.004 -0.017 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.048) (0.026) (0.051) (0.038) (0.098) (0.024) (0.033) (0.024) (0.022) 
MajGov 0.033 0.029 0.057 0.024 0.068 0.112** 0.175 0.015 0.076* 0.022 0.027 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.067) (0.033) (0.064) (0.050) (0.123) (0.031) (0.044) (0.032) (0.029) 
Unemp -0.006 0.005 -0.018* -0.011** -0.016 -0.013 0.006 -0.008* -0.010 -0.007 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.020) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
LnPop -0.405 0.173 -1.300** -0.309 -0.734 -1.123** -0.726 -0.533 -0.493 -0.556* -0.404 
 (0.276) (0.272) (0.645) (0.337) (0.635) (0.446) (1.184) (0.330) (0.445) (0.317) (0.322) 
DepVar(-1) 0.967*** 0.929*** 0.961*** 0.915*** 0.604*** 0.845*** 0.359*** 1.001*** 0.876*** 0.953*** 0.994*** 
 (0.062) (0.083) (0.074) (0.058) (0.103) (0.066) (0.112) (0.051) (0.084) (0.063) (0.067) 
            
            
No. Observ. 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 
No.Countr. 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
            
            
Central (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
ElectYr 0.012* 0.023*** -0.007 0.016** -0.022 0.011 0.053 0.026*** 0.003 0.015** 0.018*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.015) (0.007) (0.053) (0.020) (0.034) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) 
LeftGov 0.033* -0.011 0.021 0.029** 0.040 0.039 0.098 0.020 0.043** 0.028** 0.023* 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.027) (0.013) (0.088) (0.037) (0.060) (0.013) (0.017) (0.012) (0.014) 
MajGov 0.004 0.032 -0.021 -0.006 -0.017 -0.017 0.001 -0.008 0.016 0.002 0.018 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.039) (0.017) (0.081) (0.052) (0.089) (0.019) (0.024) (0.016) (0.017) 
Unemp -0.008*** 0.003* -0.005 -0.007*** -0.018* -0.024*** -0.049*** -0.008*** -0.015*** -0.007*** -0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
LnPop 0.462** 0.121 -0.026 0.019 1.624*** 0.590* 1.459*** -0.100 0.101 -0.101 0.512*** 
 (0.191) (0.102) (0.171) (0.163) (0.475) (0.309) (0.401) (0.165) (0.218) (0.142) (0.162) 
DepVar(-1) 0.806*** 0.946*** 0.881*** 0.920*** 0.494*** 0.763*** 0.380*** 0.948*** 0.871*** 0.967*** 0.795*** 
 (0.056) (0.038) (0.059) (0.045) (0.081) (0.052) (0.056) (0.035) (0.044) (0.037) (0.046) 
            
            
No. Observ. 167 167 167 167 165 167 167 167 167 167 167 
No. Countr. 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
            
            
South (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
ElectYr 0.024** 0.050*** 0.035 -0.052 0.059 0.010 0.033 0.011 0.026 0.019 0.010 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.043) (0.098) (0.057) (0.037) (0.075) (0.040) (0.039) (0.018) (0.011) 
LeftGov -0.017 -0.029 -0.040 0.166 -0.064 0.042 0.008 0.064 0.031 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.054) (0.120) (0.067) (0.050) (0.095) (0.053) (0.048) (0.022) (0.012) 
MajGov -0.010 -0.002 -0.024 0.070 -0.041 -0.019 -0.092 0.026 -0.044 -0.032 0.003 
 (0.018) (0.025) (0.071) (0.147) (0.089) (0.061) (0.124) (0.065) (0.059) (0.029) (0.016) 
Unemp -0.004*** 0.001 -0.014** -0.002 -0.018** -0.010* -0.022** -0.008 -0.010* -0.008*** -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.014) (0.008) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) 
LnPop 0.689*** 0.593** 0.415 -0.345 2.316** -0.236 -0.573 -0.086 -0.708 0.301 0.646*** 
 (0.199) (0.256) (0.608) (1.666) (0.906) (0.775) (1.145) (0.844) (0.686) (0.325) (0.167) 
DepVar(-1) 0.811*** 0.949*** 0.631*** 0.899*** 0.314*** 0.896*** 0.577*** 0.927*** 0.975*** 0.898*** 0.896*** 
 (0.066) (0.055) (0.100) (0.060) (0.116) (0.089) (0.112) (0.085) (0.064) (0.081) (0.043) 
            
            
No. Observ. 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 
No. Countr. 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
            
Notes: See Table 1. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is 
rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden; Central 
countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom; 
South countries: Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
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Table 5. Robustness check II: Sub-components analysis by group of countries 
  1. Public Services 2. Defence 3. Public Order 







ElectYr 0.042* 0.003 0.011 0.039 0.033 0.049 -0.007 -0.002 -0.212 -0.036 -0.371 -0.003 0.018 0.014 0.030 -0.264** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.029) (0.024) (0.055) (0.130) (0.050) (0.026) (0.149) (0.112) (0.281) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.020) (0.103) 
LeftGov 0.012 0.026 0.001 -0.021 0.199** 0.313* 0.127* 0.068** -0.008 -0.135 -0.182 0.001 0.015 -0.024 0.009 0.152 
 (0.047) (0.029) (0.043) (0.030) (0.097) (0.179) (0.074) (0.033) (0.200) (0.153) (0.275) (0.028) (0.027) (0.032) (0.030) (0.173) 
MajGov -0.060 -0.070 -0.059 0.017 -0.284 0.066 0.085 -0.093* -0.061 0.297 0.602 -0.023 -0.038 -0.039 0.032 -0.081 
 (0.068) (0.043) (0.059) (0.042) (0.209) (0.265) (0.101) (0.050) (0.290) (0.231) (0.367) (0.039) (0.039) (0.044) (0.040) (0.203) 







ElectYr 0.018** 0.034 0.046 -0.009 0.001 0.043 0.008 -0.025 0.089 0.011 0.009 0.034*** 0.012 0.009 0.016 -0.022 
 (0.009) (0.034) (0.044) (0.050) (0.069) (0.105) (0.024) (0.025) (0.087) (0.052) (0.066) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.060) 
LeftGov 0.025 -0.060 0.041 0.282** 0.170 -0.054 -0.045 -0.003 0.016 -0.003 -0.175* 0.023 0.020 0.019 0.050* 0.030 
 (0.028) (0.048) (0.065) (0.135) (0.125) (0.184) (0.035) (0.042) (0.112) (0.100) (0.105) (0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.026) (0.081) 
MajGov 0.013 0.039 -0.150* 0.033 0.167 -0.009 0.047 -0.036 -0.223 0.014 -0.091 0.004 -0.022 -0.013 -0.027 -0.130 
 (0.038) (0.066) (0.087) (0.134) (0.210) (0.217) (0.047) (0.054) (0.302) (0.120) (0.124) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.037) (0.110) 






ElectYr 0.070* 0.113 0.020 -0.188 0.009 0.135 0.009 0.024 0.054 0.136 -0.041 0.015 0.033 0.009 -0.037 0.014 
 (0.042) (0.146) (0.051) (0.720) (0.087) (0.183) (0.032) (0.034) (0.195) (0.197) (0.133) (0.020) (0.047) (0.042) (0.048) (0.117) 
LeftGov -0.033 0.352 0.048 -0.202 0.026 0.423 0.014 -0.042 -0.093 -0.023 0.211 -0.017 -0.018 -0.093 -0.119 0.059 
 (0.073) (0.302) (0.087) (1.472) (0.132) (0.395) (0.047) (0.067) (0.302) (0.492) (0.284) (0.039) (0.082) (0.070) (0.090) (0.264) 
MajGov -0.008 -0.068 -0.050 -0.146 0.036 -0.045 0.063 -0.092 0.138 -0.137 0.137 -0.014 -0.044 -0.043 -0.059 0.180 
 (0.072) (0.241) (0.086) (1.257) (0.142) (0.313) (0.044) (0.063) (0.455) (0.401) (0.233) (0.037) (0.079) (0.075) (0.082) (0.293) 
  4. Economic Affairs 5. Environmental Protection  







ElectYr 0.007 -0.040 0.090 -0.162 -0.011 -0.075 0.154 -0.081 -0.127 -0.020 -0.360* -0.055 -0.008 0.185* 0.001  
 (0.031) (0.040) (0.127) (0.134) (0.023) (0.187) (0.118) (0.084) (0.208) (0.075) (0.211) (0.128) (0.051) (0.101) (0.039)  
LeftGov 0.017 -0.010 0.185 0.307 0.048 -0.323 -0.001 0.050 0.233 -0.001 -0.246 0.317* 0.074 0.066 0.086*  
 (0.044) (0.057) (0.186) (0.195) (0.033) (0.234) (0.144) (0.118) (0.302) (0.105) (0.269) (0.171) (0.074) (0.144) (0.050)  
MajGov -0.019 -0.057 -0.078 0.115 0.011 0.009 0.002 -0.020 0.620 -0.024 -0.123 0.059 -0.074 0.164 -0.136*  
 (0.061) (0.080) (0.271) (0.253) (0.046) (0.344) (0.176) (0.157) (0.419) (0.154) (0.326) (0.257) (0.107) (0.202) (0.073)  







ElectYr -0.072 0.052 -0.014 0.068 0.028 -0.033 -0.009 -0.008 0.066 0.045 -0.049 0.137** -0.082* 0.016 -0.010  
 (0.109) (0.034) (0.116) (0.121) (0.049) (0.177) (0.036) (0.031) (0.123) (0.059) (0.076) (0.062) (0.049) (0.057) (0.043)  
LeftGov 0.055 0.046 -0.011 0.043 0.040 -0.174 0.024 -0.003 0.134 0.001 0.169 0.043 0.028 0.033 0.101*  
 (0.157) (0.053) (0.173) (0.206) (0.074) (0.247) (0.052) (0.044) (0.188) (0.086) (0.116) (0.100) (0.089) (0.112) (0.057)  
MajGov 0.083 0.003 -0.117 -0.121 0.006 0.092 -0.035 0.029 0.026 0.264** 0.144 -0.179 0.016 0.057 0.023  
 (0.213) (0.068) (0.225) (0.208) (0.099) (0.340) (0.072) (0.065) (0.268) (0.128) (0.150) (0.135) (0.105) (0.134) (0.082)  






ElectYr 0.101 0.151* -0.369* 0.018 0.077* -0.129 -0.060 -0.009 -0.079 -0.092* 0.006 0.155 -0.040 -0.018 -0.015  
 (0.119) (0.082) (0.193) (0.084) (0.045) (0.266) (0.082) (0.044) (0.083) (0.052) (0.060) (0.584) (0.044) (0.369) (0.060)  
LeftGov -0.019 -0.176 0.676* 0.023 -0.014 -1.120** -0.168 0.060 -0.106 0.020 -0.094 -0.398 0.104 0.006 -0.012  
 (0.185) (0.141) (0.403) (0.142) (0.088) (0.480) (0.153) (0.099) (0.146) (0.095) (0.110) (1.477) (0.093) (0.848) (0.137)  
MajGov -0.025 -0.216 0.366 -0.137 -0.102 -0.669 -0.095 -0.042 -0.116 -0.048 -0.050 -0.901 -0.009 -0.323 0.086  
 (0.186) (0.136) (0.328) (0.137) (0.079) (0.449) (0.139) (0.078) (0.148) (0.089) (0.111) (1.103) (0.074) (0.681) (0.116)  
  6. Housing Amenities 7. Health 8. Recreation 







ElectYr -0.363** 0.136 0.004 0.399 -0.278  0.005 0.008 -0.009 -0.008 0.047 0.027 -0.001 0.333 0.018 0.001 
 (0.162) (0.492) (0.046) (0.244) (0.226)  (0.017) (0.020) (0.014) (0.026) (0.038) (0.017) (0.024) (0.223) (0.054) (0.169) 
LeftGov 0.156 -1.156* -0.027 0.050 0.192  -0.032 -0.041 0.008 -0.025 0.086* 0.003 0.053 -0.096 0.012 0.060 
 (0.233) (0.610) (0.094) (0.362) (0.273)  (0.026) (0.027) (0.022) (0.040) (0.051) (0.024) (0.034) (0.287) (0.075) (0.245) 
MajGov -0.124 -0.757 -0.057 0.370 dropped  -0.042 -0.069* -0.038 0.006 0.056 0.044 0.009 0.016 0.045 0.136 
 (0.329) (0.652) (0.070) (0.436)   (0.033) (0.039) (0.028) (0.054) (0.072) (0.031) (0.051) (0.412) (0.105) (0.349) 







ElectYr 0.126 0.069** 0.080 -0.024 0.010 0.160* 0.135* 0.110** 0.033*** 0.065* 0.088** 0.019 0.018 -0.087 0.027 -0.005 
 (0.146) (0.034) (0.081) (0.034) (0.112) (0.097) (0.070) (0.053) (0.011) (0.037) (0.039) (0.020) (0.022) (0.095) (0.053) (0.074) 
LeftGov 0.182 0.110** 0.079 0.072 -0.154 0.231** 0.119 0.040 0.006 -0.046 0.058 0.019 0.031 -0.013 -0.153* -0.026 
 (0.199) (0.055) (0.120) (0.054) (0.215) (0.103) (0.125) (0.098) (0.015) (0.052) (0.057) (0.028) (0.034) (0.143) (0.080) (0.135) 
MajGov -0.178 -0.067 0.030 0.086 0.220 0.125 0.042 0.003 -0.007 -0.042 -0.036 -0.003 -0.045 0.252 -0.120 0.017 
 (0.280) (0.073) (0.156) (0.087) (0.205) (0.212) (0.124) (0.096) (0.022) (0.075) (0.084) (0.042) (0.046) (0.187) (0.097) (0.174) 






ElectYr 0.164 -0.196 0.110 0.090 -0.123 0.297 -0.001 -0.019 0.034* 0.064 0.010 0.035 0.047 0.033 0.073 0.017 
 (0.122) (0.153) (0.080) (0.098) (0.213) (0.198) (0.042) (0.038) (0.019) (0.054) (0.028) (0.031) (0.047) (0.087) (0.086) (0.090) 
LeftGov -0.155 -0.106 0.148 0.202 0.423 -0.230 -0.120* 0.096 -0.024 -0.259** 0.052 0.017 0.015 -0.101 -0.148 0.236 
 (0.183) (0.311) (0.141) (0.173) (0.789) (0.372) (0.067) (0.063) (0.025) (0.121) (0.042) (0.054) (0.089) (0.156) (0.154) (0.203) 
MajGov -0.129 -0.291 -0.006 0.257 0.158 0.317 -0.152** 0.080 0.002 -0.152 0.030 -0.098* -0.051 -0.182 -0.246* 0.127 
 (0.212) (0.232) (0.143) (0.167) (0.582) (0.342) (0.063) (0.065) (0.042) (0.103) (0.043) (0.050) (0.082) (0.140) (0.145) (0.168) 
  9. Education 10. Social Protection 







ElectYr 0.011 -0.001 0.521 -0.020 -0.022 0.014 0.045 0.018 0.002 -0.009 -0.005 0.024 0.002 -0.007 0.089 0.041 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.380) (0.020) (0.048) (0.086) (0.146) (0.024) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.050) (0.080) (0.031) (0.128) (0.057) 
LeftGov 0.001 0.017 0.060 0.023 0.011 -0.043 0.039 0.041 0.004 0.030 0.014 0.027 0.156 0.010 0.204 0.098 
 (0.019) (0.027) (0.590) (0.027) (0.065) (0.123) (0.138) (0.033) (0.024) (0.022) (0.020) (0.070) (0.105) (0.042) (0.170) (0.080) 
MajGov -0.032 -0.004 0.142 -0.070* -0.022 -0.092 0.039 -0.087* -0.019 -0.028 -0.030 -0.217** -0.147 -0.015 -0.218 0.051 
 (0.025) (0.039) (0.553) (0.040) (0.085) (0.179) (0.300) (0.046) (0.034) (0.029) (0.028) (0.100) (0.151) (0.059) (0.256) (0.118) 







ElectYr 0.024** 0.007 0.008 0.022 0.033 0.039 -0.013 0.019* 0.009 0.010 0.025* -0.001 -0.081 -0.002 0.102 -0.037 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.032) (0.026) (0.046) (0.029) (0.074) (0.011) (0.016) (0.021) (0.015) (0.027) (0.069) (0.023) (0.088) (0.028) 
LeftGov 0.027** 0.013 0.021 0.028 0.089 0.073* -0.055 -0.008 0.005 0.083*** 0.021 0.051 -0.065 0.022 -0.082 -0.028 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.060) (0.035) (0.077) (0.043) (0.109) (0.018) (0.025) (0.030) (0.020) (0.038) (0.167) (0.040) (0.228) (0.039) 
MajGov 0.021 -0.010 -0.142 -0.107* 0.192** 0.047 -0.299* 0.024 -0.020 0.014 0.035 -0.007 0.114 -0.036 0.102 0.126** 
 (0.021) (0.017) (0.117) (0.055) (0.076) (0.061) (0.155) (0.027) (0.033) (0.043) (0.030) (0.055) (0.178) (0.047) (0.191) (0.056) 






ElectYr 0.018 0.013 0.059 0.037* 0.004 0.013 0.034 0.027 0.004 0.028 0.011 -0.015 0.249 -0.104 0.181 0.063 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.281) (0.020) (0.067) (0.035) (0.094) (0.019) (0.009) (0.023) (0.031) (0.049) (0.232) (0.128) (0.362) (0.055) 
LeftGov -0.009 0.036 0.288 0.015 -0.012 0.145* 0.032 -0.007 -0.019 -0.010 -0.077 -0.031 -0.527 -0.003 0.164 -0.058 
 (0.023) (0.031) (0.578) (0.034) (0.143) (0.077) (0.162) (0.032) (0.015) (0.036) (0.056) (0.084) (0.441) (0.234) (0.416) (0.093) 
MajGov -0.052** -0.016 0.416 -0.014 -0.145 0.154*** -0.001 -0.065** -0.007 0.042 -0.048 0.050 -0.597 -0.015 -0.712 -0.078 
 (0.022) (0.030) (0.472) (0.034) (0.110) (0.059) (0.162) (0.030) (0.017) (0.039) (0.055) (0.081) (0.406) (0.221) (0.557) (0.086) 
                  
Notes: See Tables 1 to 4. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is 
rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. Only the estimated coefficients for the political variables are presented here, but all 
regressions were estimated with the same covariates as in the baseline model. The estimates for the coefficients on the other  
control variables are available upon request. The lack of variability in the data makes it impossible to run the model for 
TransfGen, (in Public Services), OthDef (in Defence), PubOrdRD (in Public Order), OthHous for Nordic countries (in Housing), 
OthHlth (in Health), OthEduc (in Education) and OthRecr (in Recreation). 
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Table 6. Opportunistic effects in the ratios between the public expenditure components 
 PubServ Defence PubOrder EconAff Environm Housing Health Recreat Educ SocProtect TotExpd 
            
PubServ -- 0.029* 0.036† 0.036† 0.032** 0.021 0.018† 0.024* 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 
 -- (0.016) (0.024) (0.024) (0.016) (0.034) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Defence  -- 0.004 0.007 0.002 -0.006 -0.014 -0.009 -0.009 -0.011 -0.008 
  -- (0.032) (0.030) (0.023) (0.038) (0.021) (0.021) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
PubOrder   -- 0.013 -0.003 -0.001 -0.019 -0.014 -0.014 -0.017 -0.013 
   -- (0.026) (0.020) (0.035) (0.015) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) 
EconAff    -- -0.007 -0.009 -0.026 -0.024 -0.015 -0.015 -0.013 
    -- (0.026) (0.036) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) 
Environm     -- -0.003 -0.016† -0.011 -0.011 -0.013 -0.010 
     -- (0.033) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Housing      -- -0.013 -0.013 -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 
      -- (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.031) 
Health       -- 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.005 
       -- (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Recreat        -- -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 
        -- (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Educ         -- -0.003 0.001 
         -- (0.005) (0.005) 
SocProtect          -- 0.002 
          -- (0.005) 
TotExpd           -- 
           -- 
            
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 
1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. † denotes statistical significance at 10% level on one-tail. Each line presents the electoral effect 
(ElectYr coefficient, where each regression was estimated with the same covariates as in the baseline model) for the 
logarithm of the ratio of the respective component to each of the other components that are in each column. The estimates 
for the coefficients on the other regressors are not reported here to save space, but they are available upon request. 
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Table A.1. Description of the Variables 
Variable Description 
  
TotExpd Total general government expenditure, real value (base year: 2005), millions of Euros. 
PubServ General public services, which comprises the following items: (i) Executive and legislative organs, 
financial and fiscal affairs, and external affairs (ExecAff); (ii) Foreign economic aid (ForAid); (iii) 
General services (GServ); (iv) Basic research (BasicRD); (v) R&D general public services (GServRD); 
(vi) Other general public services (OthServ); (vii) Public debt transactions (DebtTRS); (viii) Transfers of 
a general character between different levels of government (TransfGen). 
Defence Defence expenditures, which comprises the following items: (i) Military defence (MilDef); (ii) Civil 
defence (CivDef); (iii) Foreign military aid (FMilAid); (iv) R&D defence (DefRD); (v) Other defence 
expenditures (OthDef). 
PubOrder Public order and safety, which comprises the following items: (i) Police services (Police); (ii) Fire-
protection services (Fire); (iii) Law courts (Courts); (iv) Prisons (Prisions); (v) R&D public order and 
safety (PubOrdRD); (vi) Other public order and safety expenditures (OthPO). 
EconAff Economic affairs expenditures, which comprises the following items: (i) General economic, commercial 
and labour affairs (GenAff); (ii) Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting (Agric); (iii) Fuel and energy 
(Energy); (iv) Mining, manufacturing and construction (Constr); (v) Transport (Transp); (vi) 
Communication (Communic); (vii) Other industries (OthInd); (vii) R&D economic affairs (EAffRD); (ix) 
Other economic affairs expenditures (OthEAff). 
Environm Environmental protection expenditures, which comprises the following items: (i) Waste management 
(Waste); (ii) Waste water management (WastWater); (iii) Pollution abatement (Pollut); (iv) Protection of 
biodiversity and landscape (Protect); (v) R&D environmental protection (EnvirRD); (vi) Other 
environmental protection expenditures (OthEnvir). 
Housing Housing and community amenities, which comprises the following items: (i) Housing development 
(HousDev); (ii) Community development (ComDev); (iii) Water supply (WatSup); (iv) Street lighting 
(StrLight); (v) R&D housing and community amenities (HousRD); (vi) Other housing and community 
amenities expenditures (OthHous). 
Health Health expenditures, which comprises the following items: (i) Medical products, appliances and 
equipment (MedProd); (ii) Outpatient services (OutPServ); (iii) Hospital services (HospServ); (iv) Public 
health services (PubHlth); (v) R&D health (HlthRD); (vi) Other health expenditures (OthHlth). 
Recreat Recreation, culture and religion expenditures, which comprises the following items: (i) Recreational and 
sporting services (Sports); (ii) Cultural services (Culture); (iii) Broadcasting and publishing services 
(Broadcast); (iv) Religious and other community services (Religious); (v) R&D recreation, culture and 
religion (RecrRD); (vi) Other recreation, culture and religion expenditures (OthRecr). 
Educ Education expenditures, which comprises the following items: (i) Pre-primary and primary education 
(Prim); (ii) Secundary education (Second); (iii) Post-secundary non-tertiary education (PosSec); (iv) 
Tertiary Education (Tert); (v) General education expenditures not defined by level (Genr); (vi) 
Subsidiary services to education (SubServ); (vi) R&D education (EducRD); (viii) Other education 
expenditures (OthEduc). 
SocProtect Social protection expenditures, which comprises the following items: (i) Sickness and disability 
(SickDis); (ii) Old age (Olders); (iii) Survivors (Survivors); (iv) Family and children (Family); (v) 
Unemployment protection (UnemPrt); (vi) Housing protection (HousPrt); (vii) Social exclusion 
(SocExcl); (viii) R&D social protection (SocPrtRD); (ix) Other social protection expenditures (OthSocP). 
ElectYr Dummy variable that takes de value of 1 in the year of legislative elections; 0 otherwise. 
LeftGov Dummy variable that takes de value of 1 when there is hegemony or dominance of left-wing parties in 
the cabinet; 0 otherwise. 
MajGov Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a single party or coalition has majority in the parliament; 
0 otherwise.  
Unemp Unemployment rate. 
Pop Population, in thousands. 
  
Notes: All government expenditure components are in real values (base year: 2005). 
Sources: OECD (2009), Government at a Glance; Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database); Comparative 
Political Data Set I (http://www.cpds-data.org/). 
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Table A.2. Descriptive Statistics 
 Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
      
TotExpdpc 365 13.915 5.299 4.381 32.934 
PubServpc 365 2.009 0.662 0.777 3.727 
Defencepc 365 0.415 0.236 0.003 1.109 
PubOrderpc 365 0.433 0.152 0.002 1.088 
EconAffpc 365 1.380 0.731 0.127 7.985 
Environmpc 365 0.225 0.165 0.022 0.855 
Housingpc 365 0.240 0.166 0.020 1.517 
Healthpc 365 1.868 0.835 0.130 5.552 
Recreatpc 365 0.372 0.254 0.010 1.465 
Educpc 365 1.665 0.758 0.356 4.155 
SocProtectpc 365 5.307 2.430 1.028 13.217 
ElectYr 414 0.261 0.440 0 1 
LeftGov 414 0.264 0.441 0 1 
MajGov 414 0.742 0.438 0 1 
Unemp 414 7.373 4.097 0.469 25.126 
Pop 414 21765.280 24942.880 254.800 82502.000 
      
Notes: All the government expenditures are in thousands of Euros per capita (in real values, base year: 2005); the 
unemployment rate is in percentage; and the total population is in thousands. Time period: 1990-2012 (annual data); 
Countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. 
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Table A.3. Sensitivity analysis I: Electoral timing 
Log of (p.c.) TotExpd PubServ Defence PubOrder EconAff Environm Housing Health Recreat Educ SocProtect 
Before (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
YrBefElect 0.006 -0.008 -0.007 0.035 0.048* 0.016 0.047 0.001 0.025 0.002 -0.003 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.020) (0.030) (0.029) (0.020) (0.041) (0.014) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008) 
ElectYr 0.015** 0.033*** 0.003 0.010 0.013 0.007 0.025 0.018 0.019 0.014* 0.015** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.018) (0.026) (0.024) (0.018) (0.036) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.007) 
LeftGov -0.003 -0.001 -0.015 0.048 -0.036 0.031 0.050 0.021 0.017 0.013 0.003 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.023) (0.032) (0.037) (0.022) (0.043) (0.016) (0.017) (0.010) (0.008) 
MajGov 0.004 0.020 -0.007 0.011 -0.001 0.004 -0.004 0.002 0.008 -0.009 0.012 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.031) (0.043) (0.042) (0.029) (0.061) (0.020) (0.022) (0.013) (0.011) 
Unemp -0.006*** 0.003** -0.010*** -0.007 -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.024*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
LnPop 0.063 0.167** -0.146 0.041 1.127*** -0.065 0.556 -0.189 -0.352** -0.162* 0.063 
 (0.093) (0.078) (0.174) (0.266) (0.305) (0.202) (0.352) (0.156) (0.155) (0.097) (0.103) 
DepVar(-1) 0.934*** 0.940*** 0.817*** 0.902*** 0.542*** 0.874*** 0.495*** 0.959*** 0.960*** 0.970*** 0.945*** 
 (0.026) (0.024) (0.034) (0.025) (0.042) (0.030) (0.034) (0.025) (0.024) (0.022) (0.026) 
            
No. Observ. 346 346 346 346 344 346 346 346 346 346 346 
No. Countr. 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
            
            
After (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
YrAftElect -0.006 -0.004 0.016 -0.027 -0.014 -0.010 -0.028 -0.018 -0.021 -0.014* -0.010 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.018) (0.026) (0.025) (0.018) (0.036) (0.013) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007) 
LeftGov -0.003 -0.003 -0.015 0.049 -0.035 0.031 0.051 0.020 0.017 0.013 0.002 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.023) (0.032) (0.037) (0.022) (0.043) (0.016) (0.017) (0.010) (0.008) 
MajGov 0.003 0.021 -0.005 0.007 -0.006 0.003 -0.008 0.001 0.005 -0.009 0.012 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.031) (0.043) (0.042) (0.029) (0.060) (0.020) (0.022) (0.013) (0.011) 
Unemp -0.006*** 0.003** -0.010*** -0.007 -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.024*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
LnPop 0.062 0.170** -0.154 0.073 1.151*** -0.050 0.593* -0.182 -0.336** -0.164* 0.064 
 (0.093) (0.080) (0.173) (0.266) (0.303) (0.204) (0.351) (0.156) (0.155) (0.096) (0.104) 
DepVar(-1) 0.937*** 0.937*** 0.816*** 0.900*** 0.542*** 0.873*** 0.493*** 0.960*** 0.961*** 0.973*** 0.947*** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.034) (0.025) (0.043) (0.030) (0.035) (0.025) (0.024) (0.022) (0.026) 
            
            
No. Observ. 346 346 346 346 344 346 346 346 346 346 346 
No. Countr. 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
            
            
Timing (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
ElectTiming 0.018* 0.035*** -0.007 0.018 0.027 0.011 0.053 0.024 0.029 0.022** 0.019** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.028) (0.040) (0.036) (0.027) (0.056) (0.019) (0.021) (0.011) (0.009) 
LeftGov -0.003 -0.002 -0.016 0.049 -0.034 0.031 0.052 0.020 0.018 0.013 0.002 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.023) (0.032) (0.036) (0.022) (0.043) (0.016) (0.017) (0.010) (0.008) 
MajGov 0.004 0.021 -0.006 0.009 -0.005 0.003 -0.006 0.002 0.007 -0.009 0.012 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.031) (0.043) (0.042) (0.029) (0.060) (0.020) (0.022) (0.013) (0.011) 
Unemp -0.006*** 0.003** -0.010*** -0.007 -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.024*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
LnPop 0.063 0.172** -0.148 0.058 1.155*** -0.056 0.581* -0.184 -0.338** -0.160* 0.064 
 (0.093) (0.079) (0.173) (0.266) (0.302) (0.203) (0.351) (0.158) (0.155) (0.097) (0.104) 
DepVar(-1) 0.935*** 0.940*** 0.817*** 0.901*** 0.539*** 0.873*** 0.493*** 0.959*** 0.959*** 0.969*** 0.945*** 
 (0.026) (0.024) (0.034) (0.025) (0.043) (0.030) (0.035) (0.025) (0.024) (0.022) (0.026) 
            
            
No. Observ. 346 346 346 346 344 346 346 346 346 346 346 
No. Countr. 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
            
Notes: See Table 1. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is 
rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. Electoral timing is a variable that measures the proportion of time a government is 
in office in a particular year, since it has been elected (until the next election); it is equal to 1 in the election year. 
Variables for the interactions between ElectYr and LeftGov, MajGov and Unemp were also considered in other 
regressions, but the respective coefficients were always statistically insignificant. Those results are not reported here to 
save space, but they are available upon request. 
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Table A.4. Sensitivity analysis II: Political orientation,political support, economic environment and 
population 
Log of (p.c.) TotExpd PubServ Defence PubOrder EconAff Environm Housing Health Recreat Educ SocProtect 
Orientation 
& Support 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
ElectYr 0.012* 0.027*** 0.001 0.012 -0.009 0.004 0.014 0.020* 0.009 0.016** 0.017*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.017) (0.025) (0.028) (0.017) (0.035) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.006) 
Partisan1 -0.001 0.011 0.021 -0.062* -0.003 -0.037 -0.093** -0.029 -0.024 -0.014 0.001 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.026) (0.036) (0.040) (0.025) (0.047) (0.018) (0.019) (0.011) (0.009) 
Partisan2 0.010 0.037* 0.027 -0.100 0.072 -0.037 -0.066 -0.029 -0.013 -0.021 -0.003 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.044) (0.062) (0.067) (0.042) (0.085) (0.030) (0.032) (0.019) (0.016) 
Partisan3 0.003 0.022 0.036 -0.072 0.020 -0.018 -0.070 -0.030 0.005 -0.010 -0.014 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.036) (0.052) (0.051) (0.034) (0.069) (0.025) (0.026) (0.015) (0.013) 
Partisan4 -0.011 0.041** 0.023 -0.064 -0.084 -0.026 -0.132* -0.030 -0.008 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.040) (0.055) (0.059) (0.037) (0.075) (0.026) (0.028) (0.017) (0.014) 
GovSup>50% -0.002 0.011 -0.020 0.013 0.022 -0.016 -0.031 -0.001 0.002 -0.015 0.004 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.032) (0.044) (0.044) (0.030) (0.061) (0.021) (0.022) (0.013) (0.011) 
Unemp -0.006*** 0.003** -0.010*** -0.007 -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.024*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
LnPop 0.068 0.143* -0.142 0.136 1.099*** 0.025 0.680* -0.172 -0.317** -0.141 0.055 
 (0.097) (0.087) (0.187) (0.287) (0.326) (0.211) (0.389) (0.161) (0.160) (0.101) (0.108) 
DepVar(-1) 0.933*** 0.928*** 0.815*** 0.900*** 0.529*** 0.869*** 0.487*** 0.960*** 0.960*** 0.971*** 0.949*** 
 (0.026) (0.024) (0.035) (0.025) (0.045) (0.030) (0.036) (0.025) (0.024) (0.022) (0.026) 
            
            
No. Observ. 346 346 346 346 344 346 346 346 346 346 346 
No.Countr. 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
            
            
Economy & 
Population 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
ElectYr 0.012** 0.037*** 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.009 0.016 0.010 0.012* 0.016*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.016) (0.023) (0.024) (0.016) (0.032) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.006) 
LeftGov -0.001 0.001 -0.012 0.052 -0.034 0.023 0.041 0.023 0.015 0.017* 0.004 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.024) (0.033) (0.038) (0.023) (0.045) (0.016) (0.017) (0.010) (0.009) 
MajGov 0.009 0.028** 0.006 0.025 -0.006 0.001 -0.038 0.014 0.014 0.002 0.014 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.033) (0.046) (0.044) (0.031) (0.065) (0.022) (0.023) (0.013) (0.012) 
RealGDPgr 0.004*** 0.002 0.007** 0.007 -0.002 0.009*** -0.001 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.007*** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Young -0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.077*** -0.038*** -0.107*** 0.005 -0.007 0.006 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.013) (0.019) (0.021) (0.014) (0.027) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) 
Elderly 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.004 -0.041** -0.022* -0.079*** 0.004 -0.004 0.007 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.013) (0.017) (0.018) (0.011) (0.025) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) 
DepVar(-1) 0.974*** 0.965*** 0.844*** 0.901*** 0.569*** 0.865*** 0.456*** 0.972*** 0.956*** 0.999*** 0.953*** 
 (0.022) (0.028) (0.038) (0.028) (0.045) (0.032) (0.043) (0.028) (0.025) (0.020) (0.020) 
            
            
No. Observ. 346 346 346 346 344 346 346 346 346 346 346 
No.Countr. 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
            
Notes: See Table 1. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is 
rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. Variables for the interactions between LeftGov, MajGov (or GovSup>50%) and 
Unemp (or RealGDPgr) were also considered in other regressions, but the respective coefficients were always statistically 
insignificant. Those results are not reported here, but they are available upon request. 
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